

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

Paul Leslie Cox, # 75206,)	C/A No. 8:13-2829-TMC-JDA
)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	Report and Recommendation
)	of
State of South Carolina;)	Magistrate Judge
Attorney General Allen Wilson,)	
)	
)	
Defendants.)	

BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE

Plaintiff is an inmate at the Perry Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. In the above-captioned case, Plaintiff has brought suit against the State of South Carolina and the Attorney General of South Carolina with respect to South Carolina' "UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORNOGRAPH [*sic*] LAW" [Doc. 1 at 2].

In the "STATEMENT OF CLAIM" portion of the Section 1983 Complaint, Plaintiff alleges or contends: (1) the "three strikes" law cannot be applied to suit Section 1983 case because the "PORNO LAW WAS ON THE BOOKS" prior to the enactment of the "three strikes" law in 1996; (2) the "PORNOGRAPHIC LAW" is unconstitutional because it carries a ten-year prison sentence and "SHOULD CARRY 30 YRS. LIKE THE STATORY [*sic*] RAPE LAW DOES[;]" and (3) it is statutory rape for the child to make "A PORNO FILM." [*Id.* at 3]. In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks: (1) a finding that the "PORNOGRAPHIC LAW OF AN UNDERAGE CHILD" is unconstitutional; and (2) attorney's fees [*Id.* at 4].

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review for Pro Se Complaints

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31–35 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 519 (1972)(*per curiam*); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr.*, 64 F.3d 951, 953–56 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70, 71–74 (4th Cir. 1983); *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295–96 (4th Cir. 1978); and *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. See *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 90–95 (2007)(*per curiam*); *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10 (1980)(*per curiam*); and *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319, 321–23 (1972)(*per curiam*). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint or petition, a plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. *Merriweather v. Reynolds*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (D.S.C. 2008). Nonetheless, a litigant must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant or respondent is plausibly liable, not merely possibly liable. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 680–84 (2009). Even when considered under this less stringent standard, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore

a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).

Requirements for a Cause of Action Under Section 1983

This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting *Baker v. McCollan*, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States;” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” *Mentavlos v. Anderson*, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal court from entertaining a suit brought by a citizen against his or her own state, *Hans v. Louisiana*, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), or against an instrumentality of the state considered an “arm of the State[.]” *Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Doe*, 519 U.S. 425, 430 (1997). Similarly, to the extent that the South Carolina Attorney General is being sued in his official capacity as an agent of South Carolina, this action cannot be brought in this federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment. See *Morstad v. Dept. of Corr. and Rehab.*, 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir.1998) (“absent a waiver, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the state and its officials acting in their official capacities from § 1983 liability”). Furthermore, the doctrine of respondeat superior (or supervisory liability) generally is inapplicable to § 1983 suits. See *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); and *Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.*, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142–43 (4th Cir. 1982), *abrogated on other grounds by Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin*, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Plaintiff is “struck out”

Plaintiff is subject to the “three strikes” rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The “three strikes” rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A federal court may take judicial notice of its own records. See, e.g., *Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil*, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.’”). It can be judicially noticed that Plaintiff has filed three prior cases in this Court, which have been dismissed *with prejudice*, as frivolous, and deemed “strikes” under § 1915(g). See *Cox v. U.S. Att’y Gen., et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:12-591-TMC, 2012 WL 1570093 (D.S.C. May 3, 2012); *Cox v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr. Dir. Jon E. Ozmint, et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:12-225-TMC, 2012 WL 1415149 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2012); and *Cox v. United States*, Civil Action No. 3:12-50-TMC, 2012 WL 1158861 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2012). In light of these “strikes” imposed in 2012, Plaintiff cannot proceed with the instant Complaint unless his claim satisfies the exception for imminent physical harm provided by the “three strikes” rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and *Torres v. O’Quinn*, 612 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2010).

Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act is applicable with respect to “strikes” entered after its enactment on April 26, 1996. See *Altizer v. Deeds*, 191 F.3d 540, 545–47 (4th Cir. 1999); and *Cox v. United States*, Civil Action No. 3:12-52-TMC-JRM, 2012 WL 1570081, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2012) (“In this case, Plaintiff provides no facts to demonstrate that the three strikes rule was retroactively applied to any of his civil actions filed in federal court prior to the law’s enactment. In addition, the enactment of the three strikes rule in no way increases Plaintiff’s punishment for his current conviction. As such, Plaintiff’s *ex post facto*

argument is without merit and this case is subject to summary dismissal.”), *adopted by* 2012 WL 1570075 (D.S.C. May 3, 2012), which was a prior case filed by Plaintiff.

The Complaint in the above-captioned case does not fit within the exception to proceed *in forma pauperis* as Plaintiff does not allege that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Therefore, to proceed with this Complaint, Plaintiff must pay the full filing fee. Effective May 1, 2013, the Judicial Conference of the United States raised the filing fee for a civil case. The filing fee (set by the Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States) for a non-habeas civil action is now four hundred dollars (\$400). As a result, Plaintiff must pay the full filing fee of four hundred dollars (\$400).

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that Plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* [Doc. 2] be DENIED. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be given twenty-one (21) days from the date the United States District Judge rules on this Report and Recommendation to pay the filing fee of four hundred dollars (\$400) and that the Office of the Clerk of Court withhold entry of judgment until such time for payment expires. If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the specified time period, it is further recommended that the Complaint be dismissed *without prejudice* under the “three strikes” rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of Court enter the required final judgment at the close of the twenty-one-day period permitted for payment of the filing fee.

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Notice on the next page.

s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge

October 21, 2013
Greenville, South Carolina

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

Plaintiff is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. **Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

**Robin L. Blume, Clerk of Court
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street — Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601**

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).